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Abstract
We design a laboratory experiment to study behavior in a multidivisional organi-
zation. The organization faces a trade-off between coordinating its decisions across
the divisions and meeting division-specific needs that are known only to the division
managers, who can communicate their private information through cheap talk. While
the results show close to optimal communication, we also find systematic deviations
from optimal behavior in how the communicated information is used. Specifically,
subjects’ decisions show worse than predicted adaptation to the needs of the divisions
in decentralized organizations and worse than predicted coordination in centralized
organizations. We show that the observed deviations disappear when uncertainty
about the divisions’ local needs is removed and discuss the possible underlying mech-
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1 Introduction
Coordination problems play a central role in organizations. Firms coordinate production
decisions across divisions, districts in federal systems coordinate policies, and NGOs coor-
dinate their decisions across countries. Often, such problems are complicated by privately
known motives of the decision makers.1 Two division managers attempting to coordinate
their business strategies, for instance, might have incomplete knowledge of each other’s
goals. When this is the case, coordination can be facilitated by a communication channel
between the managers, such as that established in General Motors by Alfred Sloan in the
1920s (Alonso et al., 2008).
While the manner in which private information is communicated and used to coordinate
decisions has been explored in recent theoretical work,2 key predictions of these models
remain to be tested. The present paper uses a laboratory experiment to provide a first
attempt, focusing on the question below:
Main Question. What effect does the structure of an organization have on (i) how pre-
cisely private information is communicated and (ii) how the communicated information is
used?
Following Alonso et al. (2008), the experiment makes use of two types of organizational
structures, centralized and decentralized, operationalizing them as simple coordination
games.3 A decentralized game is played between two agents, with a single decision to be
made by each.4 An agent has private information about her local conditions, which affect
the payoff the agent receives from her own decision. She incurs an adaptation loss if her
decision fails to adapt to her local conditions, and a coordination loss if her decision is not
perfectly aligned with the decision of the other agent, therefore facing a trade-off between
adaptation and coordination. The agents can communicate with each other before making
their decisions.
1Several literatures build on this insight. Carlsson and Van Damme (1993) apply this idea in the context
of global games; Baliga and Sjo¨stro¨m (2004) in the context of games of conflict; Dessein and Santos (2006)
in the context of organizational economics.
2See, e.g., Alonso et al. (2008), Rantakari (2008), Dessein et al. (2010), Alonso et al. (2015).
3While intermediate cases in which the principal retains some, but not all, of the decision making
authority can also be considered (Rantakari, 2008), the two extreme cases provide the sharpest contrast
in theoretical predictions and are therefore particularly well-suited to implementation in the lab.
4In applications of the model, an agent could be a manager in charge of a division or a function within
a firm, a local district, a state government, etc.
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In a centralized game, decision rights are delegated to an unbiased coordinator, referred
to as the principal, who maximizes joint profits and is uninformed about both local con-
ditions. The agents can communicate their private information to the principal before the
decisions are made. Because the answer to our Main Question above in theory depends
on the size of incentives to coordinate, the experimental treatments independently ma-
nipulate the structure of the game (centralized vs. decentralized) and the importance of
coordination (high vs. low) for individual payoffs.
Our results show that models in the organizational economics literature capture key
features of how subjects communicated in the experiment but provide an incomplete ex-
planation of how the communicated information was used. Furthermore, the direction in
which subjects’ behavior deviated from the theory was closely tied to how authority was
allocated within the game. Thus, the principal behaved as if the importance of coordina-
tion was smaller than it actually was, i.e., focused too much of her efforts on adapting to
the agents’ privately known states, while the agents focused too much of their efforts on
coordination. We summarize these deviations from the theory as follows:
Main Result 1. The importance of coordination was overweighted by the agents under
decentralization and underweighted by the principal under centralization.
Estimating the effect of the observed over- and underweighting on payoffs, we find that
94% of the difference between the optimal and the observed losses can be explained by the
distortions in decision rules, with the remaining 6% due to communication. This is our
second main result:
Main Result 2. Most payoff losses were due to distortions of decision rules rather than
miscommunication.
Our starting point in explaining the observed distortions is the observation that uncer-
tainty enters the players’ payoff functions differently under centralization and decentral-
ization. Under decentralization, adaptation involves no uncertainty (since own states and
decisions are known), while coordination involves the other agent’s potentially uncertain
decision. Under centralization, coordination involves no uncertainty (since both decisions
are known), while adaptation involves the two agents’ unknown states. Thus, one way to
interpret Main Result 1 above is that the subjects overweighted the uncertain part of their
payoff functions in all treatments.
To test the hypothesis that the observed deviations were driven by uncertainty, we
use data from additional treatments with complete information and unique equilibrium
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predictions that were otherwise identical to their counterparts in the first stage of the
experiment. Consistent with the hypothesis, we find no significant distortions in decision
weights on average in these additional treatments:
Main Result 3. With complete information, there was no over- or underweighting of the
importance of coordination on average.
Section 4 of the paper provides several possible channels for how uncertainty might
have led to the observed deviations from equilibrium behavior. We show there that the
results are consistent with ambiguous communication in the presence of ambiguity-averse
message receivers as well as a simpler explanation based on gift-exchange. We also argue
in Section 4 that the observed deviations from equilibrium behavior were unlikely to be
caused by social preferences or risk aversion.
Our paper makes several methodological contributions to the experimental cheap talk
literature. First, we elicit subjects’ beliefs about their matched subjects’ states and use
the elicited beliefs to construct an empirical counterpart to the residual variance of com-
munication, a measure commonly used in theoretical work.5 This allows us to formulate
predictions about how well subjects communicate without relying on assumptions about
how they do it. Second, we use the elicited beliefs together with the equilibrium decision
rules to study how subjects decide conditional on the communicated information. This
allows us to test theoretical predictions about subjects’ decision rules directly. Third,
we use the elicited beliefs to perform a detailed payoff analysis that decomposes subjects’
losses into a component due to miscommunication and a component due to deviations from
equilibrium behavior.
The closest experimental study to ours is Brandts and Cooper (2015). While they also
compare centralized and decentralized coordination games, they do not investigate the role
of communication in coordinating multiple decisions. Moreover, the games they use are
different from ours. Specifically, the agents are symmetrically informed about each others’
local conditions as well as a global state of the world, which affects the payoffs of each
player, while the principal is uninformed about the global state but informed about the
agents’ local conditions. Unlike Brandts and Cooper, we focus on communication of private
information and its effect on coordination.6
5We also perform robustness checks of our results that do not rely on belief elicitation.
6Experimental economists have long been interested in coordination problems (see, e.g., Van Huyck
et al., 1990; Brandts and Cooper, 2006). Some existing studies also explore the role of communication as
a coordination device (see, e.g., Cooper et al., 1992; Blume and Ortmann, 2007).
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Our paper also contributes to the experimental literature investigating strategic infor-
mation transmission in the spirit of Crawford and Sobel (1982).7 Most of this literature
has focused on one sender-one receiver games, with more recent work investigating the case
of multiple senders (Vespa and Wilson, 2016). While we also consider the case of multiple
senders, our focus is on using communication to coordinate multiple decisions as opposed
to information aggregation.
The implications of uncertainty in coordination problems have only recently begun to be
studied in communication games with incomplete information.8 We show experimentally
that uncertainty biases subjects’ decision rules in a manner that depends on how authority
is allocated within an organization, and our results suggest a promising direction for future
work.
2 Experimental Design
Our experimental design is based on the models of Alonso et al. (2008) and Rantakari
(2008). Every treatment of the experiment has two players, 1 and 2, and two decisions,
d1 ∈ D and d2 ∈ D, to be made. The set D is a discretization of the interval [−1, 1] in
increments of 0.01; that is, D = {−1,−0.99,−0.98, ..., 0.98, 0.99, 1}.9 The payoff of Player
i ∈ {1, 2} is given by
pii = −(1− γ)(di − θi)2 − γ(di − dj)2, i 6= j, (2.1)
where θi is Player i’s state, or local conditions. The first component of the payoff function
captures the adaptation loss arising from the mismatch between di and θi. The second
component captures the coordination loss arising from the mismatch between the two
decisions. The parameter γ ∈ [0, 1] measures the importance of coordination for the
7See, e.g., Dickhaut et al. (1995), Blume et al. (2001), Cai and Wang (2006), Sa´nchez-Page´s and Vorsatz
(2007), and Wang et al. (2010).
8See Wilson and Vespa (2017), who find that strategic uncertainty in a repeated cheap talk game leads
to a failure to coordinate on efficient equilibria. Behavior is consistent with a repeated babbling equilibrium
even when Pareto-superior equilibria exist in which the sender uses a truthful strategy.
9The decision space is restricted because allowing the decisions to be elements of R would make it
possible for a player who behaves randomly, or simply makes a mistake while typing, to sustain enormous
losses, making the experiment infeasible. While D = R in Alonso et al. (2008) and Rantakari (2008), the
restriction to [−1, 1] does not affect the theoretical predictions. A discretization of [−1, 1] is used because
decisions in experiments can only approximate continuous variables.
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players. It is common knowledge that θ1 and θ2 are drawn independently from the set
Θ = D, with each state being equally likely.
The experiment has four initial treatments, Decentralized-High, Centralized-High,
Decentralized-Low, Centralized-Low.10 In the two Decentralized treatments, Player
1 makes decision d1, Player 2 makes decision d2, and each match consists of two players.
In the two Centralized treatments, the decisions d1 and d2 are made by an additional
Player 3 (the principal), whose payoff is given by the average of the payoffs of Player 1 and
Player 2:11
pi3 =
pi1 + pi2
2
.
Each subject starts the session with an initial endowment and loses points in each
period based on the decisions made in the period. In the High treatments, the points
lost by Player 1 and Player 2 in each period of the game are determined by the following
formula:
pii = −(di − θi)2 − 3 · (di − dj)2 i = 1, 2, i 6= j, (2.2)
which corresponds to a choice of γ = 3/4.12 Thus, the High treatments place a higher
weight on coordinating d1 and d2 than on adapting to each state θi. The Low treatments
place a high weight on adaptation to θi (γ = 1/4):
pii = −3 · (di − θi)2 − (di − dj)2 i = 1, 2, i 6= j. (2.3)
The timing in the decentralized treatments is as follows. First, Player 1 and 2 privately
observe their local conditions; that is, Player i observes θi, but not θj, j 6= i. Then, each
player is asked to send a message m ∈ M = Θ to the other player. The framing of the
screen is intentionally left neutral to avoid any suggestion on how to use the messages.13
This is followed by an empty box and an OK button in the bottom right corner of the
screen. After both messages are sent, they are simultaneously revealed to both players.
Then, the players are asked to make their decisions. After the decisions are made, but
before they are made public, the players make incentivized conjectures of each other’s
10We also ran some additional treatments, which we describe later.
11For Player 3, the payoff is equal to the average to ensure that the losses do not substantially differ in
magnitude from those of Player 1 and Player 2.
12The actual points lost are multiplied by a factor of 4 to make the payoff functions easier for subjects
to understand.
13Specifically, the sender sees the following information displayed on her screen: “You are Player X.
Your number [local conditions] is X. Send your message.”
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states: Player 1 guesses θ2, and Player 2 guesses θ1. At the end of each match, the players
receive feedback.14
In the centralized treatments, Player 1 and Player 2 also start each match by privately
observing their local conditions. Player 3 observes neither θ1 nor θ2. Then, Player 1
and 2 are each asked to send a message to Player 3. The screens that Player 1 and 2
see at this stage are identical to those displayed in the decentralized treatments. While
the senders decide what messages to send, Player 3 waits. After both messages are sent,
they are simultaneously revealed to Player 3, and this player is asked to make the two
decisions. After the decisions are made, the messages are made public, and all players
make conjectures about the states not known to them: Player 1 guesses θ2, Player 2
guesses θ1, and Player 3 guesses both θ1 and θ2. As in the decentralized treatments, these
conjectures are incentivized. At the end of the match, all players receive feedback.15
In all of our treatments, the state, message, and decision spaces are restricted to be
equal to each other. Thus, the θi, mi, and di variables are all selected in increments of 0.01
from the set {−1,−0.99,−0.98, ..., 0.98, 0.99, 1}. Restricting the message space to be equal
to the state space, as in Cai and Wang (2006), can be motivated from the observation that
subjects tend to interpret messages in cheap talk games using a natural language (see, e.g.,
Blume et al., 2001).16
We use subjects’ elicited beliefs to measure the quality of communication in the ex-
periment (Section 3.1) and analyze how the communicated information is used in the
decision-making stage (Section 3.2). Subjects’ conjectures of each other’s states are ob-
14The feedback information consists of the other player’s state, the other player’s decision, own points
lost due to the decisions made, own points lost from the conjecture about the other player’s state, points
lost in the period, points lost so far, and pesos lost so far.
15The feedback information consists of the unknown state(s), Player 3’s decisions, own points lost from
the decisions made, own points lost from the conjecture(s) about the other state(s), points lost in the
period, points lost so far, and pesos lost so far.
16While we thought about allowing for free communication in the experiment, we decided in favor of a
more restricted communication protocol (i) because this allowed for a more direct test of the theory, (ii)
because this approach was followed by other experimental studies in the strategic communication literature
(e.g., Cai and Wang (2006)), and (iii) because we do not think that free communication would eliminate
strategic uncertainty, multiplicity of equilibria, or the possibility of ambiguous communication. Even if
communication were unrestricted, subjects could in principle use ambiguous messages such as “my state is
close to zero” or ”my state is 0.2 units away from zero,” etc. In the experiment with free communication,
the sender’s interpretation of a message would still be conditional on beliefs about what communication
rule is being used. Strategic uncertainty is not the result of our experimental design but rather an intrinsic
feature of cheap talk games.
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tained with quadratic scoring rules (Nyarko and Schotter, 2002).17 For Player 1 and Player
2, the points lost for the guesses are equal to the square of the distance between the conjec-
ture and the true value of the state being guessed.18 In the centralized treatments, Player
3 also guesses the states of both Player 1 and Player 2.19 We interpret subjects’ elicited
conjectures as proxies of their posterior beliefs. While Section 4 of the paper discusses
some of the issues associated with belief elicitation, we also note that our main results
survive robustness checks that do not use subjects’ elicited beliefs.
After analyzing the data from the initial treatments, we ran two additional treatments
to test our explanations of the observed deviations from the theory. The treatments are
identical to Centralized-High and Decentralized-High in all respects except that local con-
ditions are common knowledge to all players. We provide more details in Section 3.
2.1 Implementation
The experiment was conducted at Instituto Tecnolo´gico Auto´nomo de Me´xico in Mexico
City between October 2014 and September 2015 using the software z -Tree (Fischbacher,
2007). After entering the laboratory, sitting down at their computer terminals, and signing
the consent forms, the subjects are distributed their treatment’s instructions.20 At the same
time that the subjects are reading the instructions, a quiz is displayed on their computer
screens. The subjects are informed that they have 20 minutes to read the instructions and
complete the quiz.21
The treatments are implemented between subjects. Each session of the experiment
consists of two practice periods followed by fifteen periods that count towards each subject’s
earnings. In each period, subjects are randomly and anonymously matched with randomly-
17Quadratic scoring rules incentivize risk-neutral subjects to report their mean beliefs truthfully.
18Formally, denote Player i’s conjecture about θj , conditional on having received message mj , by
p(θj |mj). The points lost for the conjecture are given by (p(θj |mj)− θj)2.
19For this player, the points lost are equal to the average of the two squared distances to ensure that
the losses for the guesses do not strongly differ from those of Player 1 and Player 2.
20See the online appendix at http://piotr-evdokimov.com/Appendix-Instructions.pdf. While the sample
instructions are in English, the actual instructions were administered in Spanish.
21The quiz has 8 questions that are identical for all treatments, and 4 that differ across the decentralized
and centralized treatments. The quiz tests the subjects’ understanding of statistical independence, how
they are to be matched in the experiment, the conversion of points to pesos, and the game’s basic structure.
The answers to all of the quiz questions are incentivized: each subject gains one Mexican peso for each
quiz question correctly answered. The questions are included in the online appendix.
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assigned roles at the beginning of each period.
The subjects’ earnings are determined as follows. Every subject is guaranteed a 30
Mexican pesos (≈ US$2) show up fee in addition to the earnings from the quiz. These
earnings are called the subject’s “guaranteed earnings.” In addition, each subject is given
210 Mexican pesos (≈ US$15). In each (non-practice) period of the game, each subject
loses a number of points due to her decisions and the decisions made by the subjects
with whom she is matched during the period. In addition to losing points from the game,
the subjects lose points from their conjectures of other players’ states in accordance to the
quadratic scoring rule described above. The subject’s “additional earnings” are determined
as follows:
Additional earnings = 210− 3× Total points lost during the experiment.
Each subject’s total earnings are given by the sum of the guaranteed and additional earn-
ings.22 It is explained to the subjects that any subject losing more than 50 cumulative
points (150 Mexican pesos) would be excluded from further matches, and that in the
event this happens, the remaining subjects will be rematched with each other, with some
randomly chosen subjects sitting out in each subsequent match. In practice, this never
happened, but the program we used allowed for the contingency.
2.2 Predictions
The communication rule of sender i is a mapping µi : Θ → ∆Mi from local conditions
to probability distributions over messages. Under decentralization, the decision rule of
receiver i is a mapping dDi : Θ × M1 × M2 → R, i ∈ {1, 2}, from local conditions and
messages to decisions. Under centralization, the decision rule of the sole receiver (Player
3) is a pair of mappings dCi : M1 ×M2 → R, i ∈ {1, 2}, where dCi maps a pair of messages
(m1,m2) to a decision for Player i. The belief functions of receiver i are the mappings
ηj : Mj → ∆Θ, j ∈ {1, 2}, each denoting the probability assigned by the receiver to each
state θj ∈ Θ after receiving message mj from sender j.
A communication equilibrium is defined by communication rules for Player 1 and Player
2 (µ1(m1|θ1) and µ2(m2|θ2)), decision rules for the decision makers (dDi (m1,m2, θi) under
decentralization, and dCi (m1,m2) under centralization), and belief functions for the re-
ceivers (η1(θ1|m1) and η2(θ2|m2)) such that the communication rules are optimal given the
22The instructions provide subjects with several examples of final earnings as a function of points lost,
and the quiz tests their understanding of the payment rules with yet another example.
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decision rules, the decision rules are optimal given beliefs, and the beliefs are derived from
the communication rules using Bayes’ rule whenever possible.
We define E[θi|mi], i = 1, 2, as the posterior belief held by the receiver of message
mi about local conditions θi. Following the theoretical literature, we measure the qual-
ity of communication through the residual variance of the posterior belief, defined as
E [(θi − E[θi|mi])2]. Higher residual variance means more dispersion in the posterior beliefs
and thus lower quality of communication. The advantage of such a measure in experimen-
tal settings is that the residual variance of communication is defined independently of the
partitional structure of equilibrium.23 Therefore, it can be used to measure communica-
tion quality whether or not players are conforming to any particular equilibrium or even
exhibiting non-equilibrium behavior.
It is well-known that communication games admit a multiplicity of equilibria.24 We
therefore formulate most of our predictions about equilibrium communication around the
Most Informative Equilibrium (MIE). We base our predictions on MIE for several reasons:
i) it is the equilibrium selection rule used in the theoretical literature;25 ii) MIE maximizes
ex-ante expected payoffs and it is therefore the right benchmark to compare payoff losses
in the experiment; iii) it leads to clear theoretical predictions. A different equilibrium
selection rule might generate potentially different predictions given the large number of
possible equilibrium choices across our treatments. Ultimately, we address the question of
what, if any, equilibrium is played using the experimental data.
Theory predicts the following about communication in MIE:
Prediction 1 (Communication).
1. The residual variance of communication is lower under centralization than decentral-
ization, for any γ ∈ (0, 1).
2. As the importance of coordination increases, the residual variance of communication
increases under centralization while it decreases under decentralization.
23Alonso et al. (2008) and Rantakari (2008) show that any equilibrium in which a finite number of
messages is possible is economically equivalent to one in which the communication rules take a partitional
form: a sender partitions the state space and only communicates which element of the partition the realized
state belongs to.
24It is also well-known that an uninformative equilibrium always exists in such games.
25Chen et al. (2008) provide conditions which uniquely select MIE in cheap talk games.
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The logic behind Prediction 1 is the following. Since the agents maximize their own
individual payoffs, while the principal cares about the payoffs of both agents, the incentives
of the agents are more aligned with the incentives of the principal than they are with each
other. This leads communication to be more informative under centralization than decen-
tralization, as long as γ < 1. As γ increases under centralization, the principal cares less
about adapting to local conditions and information becomes less relevant, distorting incen-
tives of senders toward exaggeration. As γ increases under decentralization, the increased
consequences of coordination failure provide incentives for better communication.26
Recall that E[θi|mi] denotes the posterior expectation about i’s state held by the re-
ceiver of the message following message mi. Under decentralization, Player i makes the
following decision in equilibrium after receiving the message mj:
dDi = (1− γ)θi +
γ2
1 + γ
E[θi|mi] + γ
1 + γ
E[θj|mj], i = 1, 2, i 6= j. (2.4)
The agent’s decision rule is a linear function of her own state θi, her own posterior E[θj|mj],
and the other agent’s posterior E[θi|mi]. When the importance of coordination is low, both
agents put large weights on their own local conditions and small weights on the other pieces
of information. As coordination needs increase, both players increase the weight on the
information provided by the other player, and decrease the weight on their own private
information, which leads to more coordination in equilibrium.27 We estimate the decision
rule in Equation 2.4 as part of our statistical analysis of the data to quantify the magnitude
and direction of the deviations from optimal behavior.
Under centralization, the principal makes the following decisions after receiving the
message m = (m1,m2):
28
dCi =
1 + γ
1 + 3γ
E[θi|mi] + 2γ
1 + 3γ
E[θj|mj], i = 1, 2, i 6= j. (2.5)
The decision rules are functions of the principal’s posterior beliefs about the players’ states.
When the importance of coordination is low, the posterior about Player i’s state has a
26Prediction 1 is robust to social preferences. Alonso et al. (2008) consider a variation of the model
described above in which Player 1 maximizes λpi1 + (1 − λ)pi2 and Player 2 maximizes (1 − λ)pi1 + λpi2,
where λ ∈ [ 12 , 1]. Although the payoff functions used in the experiment set λ = 1, it is in principle
plausible that Player 1 and Player 2 assign strictly positive weights to each other’s payoffs. However, for
a fixed γ, it can be shown that the difference in the quality of communication under centralization and
decentralization, while shrinking as λ approaches 12 , remains strictly positive. Similarly, for any fixed λ,
the arguments regarding the effect of γ on the quality of communication remain valid.
27It can be shown that the decisions converge to each other as γ → 1.
28See Alonso et al. (2008) and Rantakari (2008) for derivations of the decision rules described in this
section.
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much larger weight in determining di than the posterior about the state of Player j. As
the importance of coordination increases, the weights on the two posteriors become closer
to each other. These comparative statics can be summarized as follows:
Prediction 2 (Optimal Decisions). As the importance of coordination increases:
1. Under centralization, Player 3 puts more weight on the information communicated
by Player j when making decision di.
2. Under decentralization, Player i, i = 1, 2, puts less weight on her own local conditions
and a larger weight on the information communicated by Player j.
We can also use the decision rules in Equation 2.4 and Equation 2.5 to formulate
predictions about average degrees of adaptation and coordination in the experiment. The
advantage of centralization lies in the principal’s ability to perfectly control the degree to
which the decisions are coordinated with each other. The principal, however, lacks complete
knowledge of the other players’ local conditions, which makes adaptation difficult. By
contrast, under decentralization, the players can perfectly control the degree of adaptation
of their decisions to their own local conditions, but coordination is difficult because each
player only controls her own decision.
Let CLk = E[(d1 − d2)2], k ∈ {C(entralized), D(ecentralized)}, denote the expected
(normalized) coordination loss.29 In MIE, the principal’s comparative advantage at coor-
dination generates a smaller coordination loss under centralization than under decentral-
ization. Moreover, as γ increases, the coordination loss falls regardless of how authority is
allocated.30 This implies the following prediction, which is proved in Proposition 1 of the
online appendix:
Prediction 3 (Coordination Losses).
1. The average coordination loss is larger under decentralization than centralization.
2. As the importance of coordination increases, the average coordination loss decreases
under both centralization and decentralization.
29This quantity is normalized by γ and hence does not represent actual utility or point losses.
30The model is sufficiently tractable to also allow the computation of correlations between decisions,
and between decisions and states, in closed form. However, we base our predictions on coordination and
adaptation losses (see below) because they are easier to test compared to predictions based on correlation
coefficients.
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Similarly, we can compute the expected (normalized) adaptation loss in MIE for an
arbitrary Player i, i = 1, 2, denoted by ALik = E[(d
k
i − θki )2], k ∈ {C,D}. The agents’
comparative advantage at adaptation leads to larger adaptation losses under centralization
than under decentralization. As coordination becomes more important, the adaptation
loss rises regardless of how authority is allocated.31 The following prediction is proved in
Proposition 2 of the online appendix:
Prediction 4 (Adaptation Losses).
1. The average adaptation loss is larger under centralization than decentralization.
2. As the importance of coordination increases, the average adaptation loss increases
under both centralization and decentralization.
Thus, the games lend themselves to a rich array of predictions about communication
quality, decision rules, and adaptation/coordination losses. We now describe the experi-
mental data.
3 Results
For the initial treatments with incomplete information, we collected data from 238 un-
dergraduate students recruited from introductory level classes. A total of 14 experimental
sessions were conducted with a minimum of 11 students and a maximum of 21 students per
session. The distribution of subjects among treatments is shown in Table 1.32 More sub-
jects participated in the centralized treatments to ensure that the amount of observations
(e.g., for d1 and d2) is not too unbalanced. A session lasted 75 minutes on average.
In what follows, we first discuss how subjects communicated in the experiment (Section
3.1), and second how the communicated information was used (Section 3.2). Section 3.3
31This has no immediate implication for welfare because an increase in γ also implies that adaptation
losses have a lower impact on welfare.
32The number of participants in the Centralized-High treatment is not divisible by three. This is because
one of the subjects experienced a health issue while the instructions were being administered and had to
leave the room. We re-calibrated the program in this session to accommodate 11 subjects rather than 12.
This was accomplished by matching 9 people in every period of the game, with two remaining participants
sitting out randomly. We also informed the participants in this session about the new rematching procedure.
Our results do not significantly change if this session is excluded from the analysis.
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Low γ High γ
Decentralized
3 sessions 3 sessions
N = 48 N = 56
Centralized
4 sessions 4 sessions
N = 66 N = 68
Table 1: Subjects per treatment (initial treatments with incomplete information).
quantifies the payoff consequences of deviations from equilibrium behavior, as well as the
payoff consequences of miscommunication. Section 3.4 describes the design and results of
additional treatments with complete information. All of our results focus on non-practice
periods of the experiment.
3.1 How Private Information Was Communicated
The quality of communication is in theory measured in terms of the residual variance
of the receiver’s posterior, E[θ|m], around the sender’s privately known state, that is,
E [(θ − E(θ|m))2]. To obtain a unit-free measure, we divide this variable by 1/3 (the
residual variance in the babbling equilibrium). We then assess treatment effects on the
empirical analogue of this object, by defining 3× (Other Stateit−Guessit)2 as three times
the squared distance between receiver i’s guess in period t and the true value of the state.33
If the mean of this variable is equal to 0.5, for instance, the interpretation is that one half
of the residual variance associated with the uninformative equilibrium is observed in the
data.
We regress 3×(Other Stateit−Guessit)2 against treatment dummies, allowing the error
term in the regression to be correlated for observations coming from the same session.34
While the number of sessions is small, we assume within-session correlations because this
assumption can be applied in the vast majority of our econometric analysis,35 and, when
33 We use all elicited guesses (in non-practice periods) of all subjects in our analysis of the quality of
communication. In centralized treatments, the correlation between the guesses of Player 3 and those of
Player 1 and Player 2 has a coefficient of ρ = 0.855.
34Notice that subjects in the role of Player 3 made two guesses in every period.
35E.g., even under the assumption that residuals are independent across subjects, clustering by subject
or using subject-level random effects is not appropriate when the unit of observation is a game, as in
Section 3.2 below.
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possible, provide robustness checks with subject-clustered standard errors in the appendix.
Decentralized Centralized
γ = 0.25 0.4272 >∗∗ 0.1796
(0.0574) (0.0803)
∨∗∗  ∧
γ = 0.75 0.2164 ≮ 0.3971
(0.0789) (0.2102)
Session-clustered standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, **** p < 0.001
Table 2: Treatment effects on residual variance of communication. The >∗∗ and ∨∗∗
symbols denote differences that are significant at a 5% level. The ∧ and ≮ symbols denote
differences that are not statistically significant (P > 0.1).
The results are shown in Table 2. Consistent with Prediction 1, we find that the resid-
ual variance of communication was lower under centralization than decentralization when
the importance of coordination was low (P < 0.05). The residual variance decreased with
the importance of coordination under decentralization (P < 0.05), also as predicted. There
was no significant difference between the residual variance under centralization and decen-
tralization when γ was high (P = 0.435), which is also in line with Prediction 1, according
to which the quality of communication converges to the same level in both organizational
structures as γ increases. Inconsistent with Prediction 1, we find no significant effect of γ
on the residual variance under centralization (P = 0.351).
Appendix A.3 provides some robustness checks of the result that the residual variance
of communication was significantly higher under decentralization if and only if the impor-
tance of coordination was low. As shown there, the result is observed in later periods of
the experiment taken separately, suggesting that the underlying effects were not learned
away. It is also observed if residual variance is measured using subjects’ messages as prox-
ies for guesses. I.e., even if the analysis does not use subjects’ elicited beliefs, which in
principle may be biased,36 to form a measure of communication quality, we see some of the
theoretically predicted comparative statics in the data. Moreover, the result is reflected in
distributions at the level of individual subjects and not just within-treatment averages.
36One possible source of bias is risk aversion. The results in this section are difficult to interpret if risk
aversion on the part of the message receivers is assumed, as the direction of the bias would depend on
assumptions about the message receivers’ beliefs.
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These results suggest that MIE was at least partially predictive of the treatment ef-
fects observed in the communication data. Directly comparing the predicted and observed
residual variances of communication using the standard errors in Table 2, we find that the
residual variances were not significantly lower than predicted in any of the treatments, and
significantly higher than predicted in Decentralized-Low (P < 0.01). While this suggests
at least some under-communication relative to MIE, it is consistent with behavior in other,
less informative, equilibria. On the other hand, the way in which the communicated infor-
mation was used deviated from the predictions of any communication equilibrium, not just
MIE. These deviations, which are demonstrated in Section 3.2 below, are the mainstay of
our paper.
3.2 How the Communicated Information Was Used
While our predictions about the optimal use of information are centered on subjects’ de-
cision rules (Equation 2.4 and Equation 2.5), it is instructive to first study the observed
adaptation and coordination losses. This allows us to assess treatment effects without re-
sorting to involved econometric analysis and to see if systematic deviations from optimal
coordination and adaptation are present in the data. After noting and describing these
deviations, we turn to a more rigorous analysis of subjects’ decision rules.
Subjects’ adaptation and coordination losses are plotted in Figure 1.37 It can be seen
from Figure 1 that, as predicted, subjects coordinated more and adapted less as coor-
dination became more important, and that this was true both under centralization and
decentralization. Specifically, as γ increased, the coordination loss decreased under cen-
tralization (P < 0.001), while the adaptation loss increased under both centralization
(P < 0.01) and decentralization (P < 0.05). While the decrease in the coordination loss
under decentralization was not statistically significant (P = 0.1007), the effect was in the
right direction. That adaptation losses increased but coordination losses were little affected
suggests a possible coordination failure in the Decentralized-High treatment.38
Because MIE maximizes agents’ ex-ante expected payoffs, it provides a useful bench-
mark for how well subjects should adapt and coordinate. The treatment comparisons
show that, with low γ, the coordination loss was higher under centralization than decen-
37We compute the standard errors by regressing (di − θi)2 and (d1 − d2)2 against treatment dummies,
with standard errors clustered by session. The regression results can be found in Table 23 in the appendix.
38Relative to MIE, we also find that the coordination loss was significantly higher than predicted in this
treatment.
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tralization (P < 0.05), while the adaptation loss was higher under decentralization than
centralization (P < 0.01). Both of these observations directly contradict Prediction 3 and
Prediction 4, as well as the intuition that centralized organizations are better at coordi-
nating while decentralized ones are better at adapting. When γ is high, the coordination
loss was statistically indistinguishable under centralization and decentralization, as was the
adaptation loss (both P > 0.1). These observations are also at odds with Prediction 3 and
Prediction 4. Comparing the data to the MIE predictions directly, the coordination loss
(d1−d2)2 was significantly greater than predicted for both values of γ under centralization
(P < 0.001 in both cases), while the adaptation loss (di − θi)2 was significantly greater
than predicted for both values of γ under decentralization (P < 0.001 in both cases).
Taken together, the results in this paragraph suggest that decision makers under-adapted
in decentralized treatments and under-coordinated in centralized ones.
To directly estimate the equilibrium decision rule under decentralization (Equation
2.4), we regress the decision made by subject i in period t (Decisionit) against subject i’s
state (θit), the guess of subject i’s partner about subject i’s state (Guess of the Stateit),
and the guess of subject i about her partner’s state (Guess of the Other Stateit).
39 To
accommodate the effect of γ on subjects’ decisions, we interact the explanatory variables
with a dummy that takes on the value of one for treatments with γ = 3
4
. We also place the
restriction that the weights add up to one both when γ = 1
4
and when γ = 3
4
.40 The results
are shown in the first column of Table 3. As can be seen from the interaction terms, subjects
qualitatively responded to incentives to coordinate and adapt roughly as theory predicts.
As the importance of coordination increased, the weight on θit decreased (P < 0.05), and
the weight on Guess of the Other Stateit increased (P < 0.001). Subjects’ decisions put
a smaller weight on the state and a larger weight on posterior beliefs when the incentive
to coordinate was greater.
We use Equation 2.5 as a guide to estimate an analogous model for the centralized
39Formally, the decision di made by Player i depends on her state θi, her belief about j’ state, E[θj |mj ],
and her second order belief about the belief held by Player j about state θi after having received message
mi, E[θi|mi]. We proxy this second order belief with the belief reported by Player j. While this second
order belief equals E[θi|mi] in any equilibrium, the two quantities might differ in the presence of deviations
from equilibrium. To alleviate this concern, we perform a robustness check in the appendix by re-doing
our analysis with received messages in place of reported beliefs and find similar results. Unlike elicited
beliefs, messages are common knowledge even in the presence of equilibrium deviations.
40The results are qualitatively similar if this restriction is removed. As in the rest of our analysis, we
allow the error terms it to be correlated within a session. Robustness checks using subject-clustered
standard errors can be found in the appendix.
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Decentralized Centralized
High (dummy=1 if γ = 34 ) -0.00735 0.0149
(0.0131) (0.0149)
State (θ) 0.493****
(0.0775)
Guess of the State 0.162**** 0.946****
(0.0224) (0.0196)
Guess of the Other State 0.345**** 0.0544***
(0.0572) (0.0196)
θ × High -0.270**
(0.115)
Guess of the State × High 0.0576 -0.290****
(0.0939) (0.0323)
Guess of the Other State × High 0.213**** 0.290****
(0.0598) (0.0323)
Constant 0.0197 0.00615
(0.0123) (0.0118)
Observations 1560 1320
Session-clustered standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, **** p < 0.001
Table 3: Estimated decision weights.
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treatments. I.e., we regress the principals’ decisions against their elicited posterior beliefs
with the restriction that the weights sum up to one.41 The results, reported in the second
column of Table 3, suggest that the principals’ decision rules responded in the predicted
direction to changes in incentives to coordinate. Thus, the weight on Guess of the State
decreased and the weight on Guess of the Other State increased when the importance
of coordination was high (P < 0.001 in both cases). I.e., as coordination became more
important, the principal weighted the belief about i’s state less and the belief about the
state of i’s partner more when making a decision on behalf of subject i.
Importantly, while the responses to changes in incentives to coordinate were in the right
direction both under centralization and decentralization, subjects’ decisions showed signif-
icant and systematic quantitative deviations from equilibrium (Table 4). In Decentralized-
Low, subjects underweighted their own states (P < 0.001), overweighted their partners’
posteriors (P < 0.001), and overweighted their own posteriors about their partners’ states
(P < 0.05). In Decentralized-High, subjects overweighted their own posteriors (P < 0.001).
Thus, subjects in the decentralized treatments underweighted their own states and over-
weighted their own and their partners’ beliefs. In both Centralized-Low and Centralized-
High, the principal put too much weight on the belief about θi and too little weight on
the belief about θj when making decision di (P < 0.001 in both cases). These deviations
are consistent with the hypothesis that decision makers overweighted the importance of
coordination under decentralization and underweighted it under centralization.
To quantify the degree to which coordination was over- or underweighted, we struc-
turally estimate the γ implied by the subjects’ decisions under the null hypothesis of
equilibrium. We do this separately for each of the experimental treatments using non-
linear least squares and session-clustered errors.42 The estimation results are shown in
Table 5. The estimated γ’s are significantly higher than what they should be (i.e., those
specified in the instructions) in both Decentralized-Low and Decentralized-High (P < 0.05
and P < 0.01, respectively). For example, when γ = 3
4
, the agents acted as if adaptation is
almost irrelevant. In Centralized-Low and Centralized-High, the weights are significantly
lower than what they should be (P < 0.001 in both treatments). For example, when γ = 1
4
,
the principal acted as if the weight on coordination were almost zero. We summarize these
findings as follows:
41To conserve the same variable names, we define Decisionjit to be the decision made by principal j in
period t on subject i’s behalf, Guess of the Statejit the principal’s guess about subject i’s state in period
t, and Guess of the Other Statejit the principal’s guess about the other subject’s state in period t.
42We provide a number of robustness checks below, including ones in which coefficients are estimated at
the level of individual subjects.
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Decentralized Treatments θi νi νj
Low (Predicted) 0.75 0.05 0.2
Low (Actual) 0.49**** 0.16**** 0.34**
High (Predicted) 0.25 0.32 0.43
High (Actual) 0.22 0.22 0.56****
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, **** p < 0.001
Centralized Treatments νi νj
Low (Predicted) 0.71 0.29
Low (Actual) 0.95**** 0.05****
High (Predicted) 0.54 0.46
High (Actual) 0.66**** 0.34****
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, **** p < 0.001
Table 4: Predicted equilibrium weights and the actual weights in subjects’ decision rules.
The significance levels refer to the difference between actual and predicted weights.
Main Result 1. The importance of coordination was overweighted by the agents under
decentralization and underweighted by the principal under centralization.
To see how robust the result above is to learning, we modify the non-linear least squares
model used in Table 5 by allowing the estimated γˆ’s to differ across periods in every
treatment of the experiment.43 This reveals a significant time trend in the Decentralized-
Low treatment, where the estimated γˆ loses significance by period 15 (P = 0.345). On the
other hand, the overweighting in this treatment is still positive in period 15, and the lack
of significance might simply be a question of power. We find no significant time effects on
γˆ in Decentralized-High (P = 0.496), Centralized-Low (P = 0.273), or Centralized-High
(P = 0.266). Taken together, these results suggest that the distortions identified in Table
5 are not easily learned away.
To study between-subject heterogeneity in deviations from equilibrium, we estimate
subject-level regressions analogous to those in Table 5.44 The subject-level estimates of
43The econometric details and estimation results are described in Appendix A.4.
44The model produces no estimate for one of the subjects in Centralized-High because this subject set
each of the decisions to zero. As adaptation was ignored and full coordination achieved, we manually set
γˆ = 1 for this subject.
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Figure 2: Heterogeneity in decision weights.
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Decentralized Centralized
γˆ when γ = 0.25 0.517 >∗∗ 0.25 0.0296 <∗∗∗∗ 0.25
(0.103) (0.0116)
γˆ when γ = 0.75 0.9396 >∗∗∗ 0.75 0.356 <∗∗∗∗ 0.75
(0.0375) (0.0548)
Observations 1560 1320
Session-clustered standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, **** p < 0.001
Table 5: The estimated distortions of γ.
γ in the four treatments are reported in Figure 2. The red vertical lines represent the
predicted γ’s of 0.25 and 0.75. As seen in the figure, a large fraction of subjects in the
Decentralized-High treatment acted as if γ was close to one, while a large fraction of
subjects in the Centralized-Low treatment acted as if γ was close to zero. It can also be
seen that many subjects used a γ above 0.25 in the Decentralized-Low treatment and a
γ below 0.75 in Centralized-High. While we omit a description of the relevant statistical
comparisons here, it is argued in Appendix A.4.1, which compares the observed medians
and means to their predicted values, that Main Result 1 is reflected not only in overall
averages but also in distributions at the level of individual subjects.
While the analysis so far has made use of subjects’ elicited beliefs, there is another way
to identify deviations from equilibrium decision rules in our experiment. Specifically, the
experimental design allows us to derive subjects’ implicit beliefs under the assumption of
equilibrium behavior. For the centralized treatments, because we observe the principal’s
decisions, the equilibrium decision rules in Equation 2.5 form a system of two equations in
two unknowns which can be used to solve for E(θ1|m1) and E(θ2|m2). For the decentralized
treatments, a similar procedure can be employed given knowledge of the decisions made
by each player, the true states, and the equilibrium decision rules given by Equation 2.4.
When we do this, we find that 43.19% of implicit beliefs lie outside the interval [−1, 1]
overall, with 50.96% under decentralization and 34.02% under centralization. This provides
corroborative evidence of suboptimal behavior in both treatments.
Appendix A.4 provides additional robustness checks of Main Result 1. Specifically,
Table 19 re-estimates the weights in Table 5 using subjects’ messages in place of elicited
beliefs; Table 20 re-estimates the weights in the centralized treatments replacing the be-
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liefs of Player 3 with those of Player 1 and 2; Table 21 re-estimates the weights with
standard errors clustered at the level of the decision maker; Appendix A.4.1 carries out the
above-described analysis of heterogeneity in decision rules. We find qualitatively similar
distortions of decision weights in every case.
3.3 Payoff Consequences of Deviations From Equilibrium
We now turn to an analysis of subjects’ losses in the experiment. On average, subjects
earned 163.5 Mexican pesos (≈ US$11), excluding the show-up fee and the payment from
the quiz.45 Of the 46.5 pesos subjects lost on average from playing the game and making
guesses about their partners’ states, 91% were lost from the game and 9% from the guesses.
While the average losses from playing the game were moderate, several subjects came close
to bankruptcy (losing more than 150 pesos by period 15) in the course of the experiment,
and there was significant variation across subjects, as shown in Figure 5 of Appendix A.5.
Because only good decisions ensured subjects from incurring substantial losses, we believe
that our experiment provided subjects with effective incentives.
For each team in our data set, we define the total relative payoff loss as the loss observed
in the data minus the loss predicted by MIE:
Ltotal = Lobserved − LMIE.
To compute LMIE, for every treatment, we calculate an explicit solution for the most
informative partitional equilibrium provided by Alonso et al. (2008, pp. 171-172). We then
derive the posterior beliefs that receivers would form in MIE.46 Using these posterior beliefs,
we compute the optimal decisions (using 2.4 and 2.5). Then, using 2.1, we compute the
decision makers’ utilities given the decisions. The payoffs of Player 1 and Player 2 are then
added to calculate LMIE.
We can further decompose the relative payoff loss as follows:
Ltotal = (Lobserved − Lreported beliefs)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Loss due to distortions
+ (Lreported beliefs − LMIE)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Loss due to miscommunication
. (3.1)
45At the time of the experiment, the minimum wage in Mexico was about 70 pesos per day, which is
arguably a poor reference point for students at a private research university such as ITAM. For a better
one, consider that the cost of a 15km Uber ride was around 80 pesos.
46Our simulation approximates the most informative equilibria by partitional equilibria with 231 ele-
ments.
24
Lreported beliefs is the team’s payoff loss given the decision makers’ reported beliefs. To
compute it, we calculate the equilibrium predictions for dCi and d
D
i conditional on subjects’
elicited beliefs. We then use Equation 2.1 to calculate individual utilities and add the
utilities to calculate Lreported beliefs. This gives the total amount of points that each team
would have lost if the decision makers followed the equilibrium decision rules using their
reported beliefs. Lobserved−Lreported beliefs is labeled as the loss due to distortions in Equation
3.1. We interpret this variable as the loss in payoffs due to subjects’ decisions deviating
from the equilibrium decision rules in Equation 2.4 and Equation 2.5. Lreported beliefs−LMIE
is labeled as the loss due to miscommunication. This variable captures the payoff loss due
to subjects’ posterior beliefs deviating from those suggested by MIE.
The total relative payoff loss (Lobserved − LMIE) was on average 1.39 points.47 To get
a reference for the size of this number, note that the observed loss (Lobserved) of 1.90 (or
1.39+0.51) points is approximately 3.75 times as large as the MIE benchmark (LMIE) of
0.51 points. The relative loss due to distortions was 1.31 points, while the relative loss
due to miscommunication was 0.08 points. Thus, the distortions accounted for 94% of the
overall relative loss in payoffs.48 We highlight this as one of our main results:
Main Result 2. Most payoff losses are due to distortions of decision rules rather than
miscommunication.
3.4 Complete Information Treatments
Uncertainty enters the players’ payoff functions differently under centralization and decen-
tralization. Under decentralization, adaptation involves no uncertainty (since own states
and decisions are known), while coordination involves the other agent’s potentially un-
certain decision. The opposite is true under centralization, where coordination involves
no uncertainty (since the principal controls both decisions), while adaptation is uncertain
because it involves the two agents’ unknown states. It follows that one way of restating
Main Result 1 is that the uncertain component of the payoff function was overweighted by
the decision maker under both centralization and decentralization.
To shed light on the role of uncertainty in generating the distortions in the initial treat-
ments of the experiment, we ran two additional treatments in September 2015: Decentralized-
Complete Info (N = 30, one session with 10 and one with 20 subjects) and Centralized-
47This represents the per-period average. The regression results can be found in Table 24 in the appendix.
48Appendix A.6 provides an additional analysis of subjects’ payoffs.
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Complete Info (N = 30, one session with 12 and one with 18 subjects). The treatments
were identical to Decentralized-High and Centralized-High in all respects but the follow-
ing.49 First, every player observed every state θi (i = 1, 2) before making any decision.
Second, the players did not make any guesses about the states of other players. In particu-
lar, the agents still sent messages to each other under decentralization and to the principal
under centralization.50 Thus, the only difference between the complete and incomplete
information treatments is uncertainty about θi.
51
Because the messages are irrelevant in theory, we make no predictions about residual
variance of communication in Centralized-Complete Info and Decentralized-Complete Info.
The complete information decision rules are the same as those in Equation 2.4 and Equation
2.5, with the modification that each posterior belief E[θi|mi] is replaced by the true value
of the corresponding state θi. While the decision rule under decentralization is the unique
equilibrium solution, the decision rule under centralization is the unique solution to the
principal’s decision problem:
dDi =
1
1 + γ
θi +
γ
1 + γ
θj, i = 1, 2, i 6= j, (3.2)
dCi =
1 + γ
1 + 3γ
θi +
2γ
1 + 3γ
θj, i = 1, 2, i 6= j. (3.3)
Estimating the γ’s in Equation 3.2 and Equation 3.3 using nonlinear least squares, we
find a weight of 0.774 in Decentralized-Complete Info and a weight of 0.687 in Centralized-
Complete Info. Neither of these estimates is significantly different from the predicted value
of 0.75 (P = 0.814 in Decentralized-Complete Info and P = 0.5257 in Centralized-Complete
Info).52 We also find little significant differences in predicted and observed decision weights
when the weights are estimated at the level of individual subjects. Indeed, as shown in
Figure 3, the distribution of individually estimated decision weights shifts to the left under
decentralization and to the right under centralization.
49We parametrized γ to be equal to 0.75 in the complete information treatments because the observed
distortions in this case were most robust to learning, as shown in Appendix A.4.
50While we could have removed communication from the complete information treatments, we avoided
doing this so that uncertainty and communication are not manipulated at the same time.
51As pointed out by a referee, strategic uncertainty about whether or not an opponent is playing the
right game could still be present in the complete information treatments.
52Because we only have two sessions per treatment, the standard errors for the coefficient estimates are
clustered at the level of the decision maker. The comparisons remain insignificant with session-clustered
errors.
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In Decentralized-Complete Info, the mean estimate of γ is 0.76, the median is 0.853,
and neither is significantly different from 0.75.53 In Centralized-Complete Info, the mean
estimate of γ is 0.802, and the median is 1. While the mean is not significantly different
from 0.75 (P = 0.365), the median is significantly higher (P < 0.001).
Thus, regardless of how the data is analyzed, the deviations from equilibrium behavior
are significantly reduced in the complete information treatments. Specifically, no under-
weighting of γ is observed under centralization, and no overweighting is observed under
decentralization. While behavior of the median subject deviates from equilibrium under
centralization, it deviates in the direction of overweighting the importance of coordination,
the reverse of Main Result 1. Moreover, we find no significant deviations from the predicted
decision weights on average. We summarize these findings as follows:
Main Result 3. With complete information, there was no over- or underweighting of the
importance of coordination on average.
The results in the complete information treatments are consistent with the hypothesis
that the deviations from equilibrium observed in the initial treatments were caused by
uncertainty. We discuss the possible underlying mechanisms in Section 4 below.
4 Discussion and Conclusion
Risk aversion cannot rationalize our findings.54 Thus, while the distortions associated
with risk aversion are qualitatively the same as those observed in the experiment, they
are not nearly of the right magnitude. To develop some intuition for the effect of risk
aversion on decision rules, consider the case of centralization. Noise in messages introduces
uncertainty about the principal’s adaptation losses. While a risk-neutral decision maker
53P = 0.831 for the mean and P = 0.414 for the median.
54As we show in the online appendix, risk seeking preferences generate distortions in the opposite di-
rection than observed in the data and therefore cannot explain our findings either. There are several
possible explanations for why our results differ from those of Tversky and Kahneman (1992). First, our
experiment differs substantially from the choice-theoretic experiments in the prospect theory literature
or related experiments such as Myagkov and Plott (1997). The noise in our game is not objective but
derived from other subjects’ communication rules. Second, it is possible that subjects’ reference points
are not zero (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). Because incurring no losses is difficult in our environment,
subjects might have formed expectations accordingly (Ko˝szegi and Rabin, 2006). Third, as we show be-
low, ambiguity-aversion can generate distortions in the right direction even with moderate risk-seeking
preferences.
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Figure 3: Distributions of decision weights, incomplete vs. complete information.
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only cares about the posterior expectations of the states, a risk-averse principal also cares
about the variance of her conditional expectation and might under-coordinate to decrease
this variance. Because the models of Alonso et al. (2008) and Rantakari (2008) have no
closed-form solutions with risk-averse preferences, predictions have to be obtained through
simulations. We do this in Appendix A.8 where we assume that a decision maker has
a utility function of the form U(x) = −(−x)α over her point losses x < 0, where the
parameter α > 0 determines the decision maker’s risk attitudes (Tversky and Kahneman,
1992). We argue that only 4%-17% of the observed under-coordination in the centralized
treatments can be accounted for by reasonable degrees of risk aversion.55
Ambiguity in communication provides a better explanation of our findings. Consider
again the game under centralization. If the principal is uncertain about the communica-
tion rules used by the agents, she needs to form subjective beliefs about how the states are
communicated through subjects’ messages. Assuming ambiguity-neutral preferences, the
principal can easily form posterior beliefs E(θi|mi), and ambiguity about communication
rules has no predictive power. In the presence of ambiguity aversion, however, the predic-
tions of the model change. In Appendix A.10, we perform simulations to solve the problem
of an ambiguity-averse principal under centralization. The simulation assumes that the
principal has preferences of the maxmin sort, where the min is taken over different beliefs
about the agents’ states. We find that ambiguity aversion substantially amplifies the dis-
tortions due to risk aversion. Thus, with the Tversky and Kahneman (1992)’s functional
form, a risk aversion parameter of α = 2, and ambiguity-averse preferences, the model
accounts for 16% to 50% of the under-coordination observed in the data. Moreover, if the
principal is ambiguity-averse, the model can generate distortions in the right direction even
if her utility function is moderately risk-seeking.
Although informative, the simulations described above do not assume equilibrium be-
havior. We now sketch a simple variant of the models of Alonso et al. (2008) and Rantakari
(2008) that allows for ambiguous communication in the presence of ambiguity-averse mes-
55In principle, risk aversion might also have influenced subjects’ elicited beliefs, which we used to compute
a measure of communication quality and estimate subjects’ decision rules. In a regression of elicited guesses
against true states, R2 is approximately 0.7, which suggests that subjects’ guesses of unknown states were
quite good on average. I.e., if risk aversion biased the reported beliefs, the resulting bias was small, which
is consistent with our observation that MIE rationalizes the communication data well. Second, as we
show in Appendix A.3, several of our results pertaining to communication quality are robust to defining a
measure of residual variance based on subjects’ messages as opposed to elicited beliefs. Likewise, our main
results regarding the biases in subjects’ decision rules are reflected in the analysis of subjects’ adaptation
and coordination losses, which does not rely on belief elicitation.
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sage receivers. Suppose that each division manager has access to an Ellsberg urn. An
Ellsberg urn is an urn which contains red and black balls but whose color composition is
unknown to every player. Let ρ ∈ [0, 1] denote the fraction of red balls. Each division
manager privately observes her local conditions and a draw from her Ellsberg urn before
communication takes place. Ambiguous communication occurs when the sender conditions
her message on the urn realization. While seemingly abstract, this construct can be used
to capture both intentional and unintentional vagueness in communication.
While solving the model is beyond the scope of this paper, recent theoretical work by
Kellner and Le Quement (2018) shows that ambiguous communication can be sustained in
equilibria of sender-receiver games of the Crawford and Sobel (1982) type. More precisely,
for any informative communication equilibrium without ambiguity aversion, there exists
an ambiguous communication equilibrium which strictly Pareto-dominates it. In the latter
equilibrium, communication is more informative and the receiver takes actions which are
more accommodating toward the preferences of the sender. Conjecturing that similar
results can be extended to the framework of Alonso et al. (2008) and Rantakari (2008), the
latter observation would provide a theoretical rationale for the result in our experiment
that the decision rules are more accommodating toward the message senders’ private needs
than predicted by the baseline model. Focusing on MIE, coordination losses would be
larger than predicted in the ambiguous game under centralization while adaptation losses
would be larger than predicted in the ambiguous game under decentralization. While it is
not clear that the ambiguity-averse extension of the model would capture all elements of
the data,56 it provides a promising avenue for an explanation.
A simpler explanation for the observed distortions is gift exchange.57 E.g., it might be
the case that the message receivers reward the message senders for communicating private
information, where the reward comes in the form of putting a higher weight on the mes-
sage. Under decentralization, this would lead to a larger adaptation loss than predicted;
moreover, it could lead to coordination failure (as we observe in the Decentralized-High
treatment) if the weight on the other player’s message is sufficiently high.58 Under cen-
tralization, gift exchange would lead the central manager’s decisions to be less coordinated
than predicted, as we observe in the data.
56Ambiguity aversion, for instance, would bias the belief-elicitation procedure, complicating our results
regarding communication quality. Moreover, it is not clear if equilibria exist of the ambiguous game where
the decision makers try but fail to accommodate the message senders’ needs, as we observe in the data.
57We thank an anonymous referee for pointing out this explanation.
58E.g., in the extreme case, a decision maker might completely ignore coordination, setting her decision
equal to the other player’s message.
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Another possibility is that the decision maker cares not only about her own monetary
payoffs but also the monetary payoffs of the other players, for instance using the functional
form in Levine (1998).59 Our results are not consistent with social preferences for two
reasons. First, because the principal maximizes the agents’ joint payoffs, social preferences
cannot explain the distortions observed in the centralized treatments. Second, if social
preferences caused the distortions in Decentralized-Low and Decentralized-High, we should
observe similar distortions in Decentralized-Complete Info.
Our experimental framework can be used to study a wide class of related coordination
problems. For example, Alonso et al. (2008) show that the quality of communication under
decentralization can be worse if decisions are made sequentially as opposed to simulta-
neously. This is because the player in the role of the follower has higher incentives to
misreport in order to influence the decision of the leader, which makes coordination more
difficult in theory. In light of our results, i.e., the players overweighting the importance of
coordination under decentralization, sequential decision making might make coordination
easier in practice. It would also be interesting to study how our results on communication
and behavior are affected by asymmetries in coordination needs or partial centralization
(where only one of the decisions is controlled by the principal).60 A different project could
investigate coordination in teams with incomplete information. Thus, each player in our
experiment can be identified with a team of several subjects who need to agree on which
message to send and which decision to make. Feri et al. (2010) find that team decision
making can lead to higher coordination on efficient outcomes, a testable prediction. An
open question is whether the distortions observed in our treatments will be robust to or
alleviated by decisions being made in teams. Another experiment could nest the basic
framework in a repeated game. This would bring the setup closer to real world organiza-
tions in which the same agents interact for longer periods of time and allow the dynamics
of communication61 and coordination to be investigated.
59E.g., Player 1 may be maximizing λpi1 + (1− λ)pi2 and Player 2 may be maximizing (1− λ)pi1 + λpi2,
where λ ∈ [ 12 , 1].
60Both of these extensions are theoretically explored in Rantakari (2008).
61Will subjects communicate private information more truthfully and trust more in longer relation-
ships? Does the quality of communication decrease over time in a finite game? Does the way in which
communication feeds into subjects’ decision rules change over time?
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A Appendix (For Online Publication)
A.1 Residual variance of communication
Residual variances under MIE can be computed analytically. If γ ∈ (0, 1), it is shown in
Alonso et al. (2008) that the residual variance of communication in MIE under decentral-
ization is given by
E
[
(θi − E[θi|mi])2
]
=
1
12 + 9γ
if i = 1, 2. (A.1)
Under centralization, the residual variance of communication is given by
E
[
(θi − E[θi|mi])2
]
=
γ
9 + 12γ
if i = 1, 2. (A.2)
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Figure 4: Predicted communication quality as a function of γ.
Figure 4 plots the residual variance of communication in MIE.
Note that when coordination is irrelevant (γ = 0), it is an equilibrium to tell the truth
about one’s state and set d1 equal to θ1 and d2 equal to θ2. This is true in both the
centralized and the decentralized game. Because the residual variance of communication
in the truth-telling equilibrium is equal to zero, the residual variance under centralization
exhibits a discontinuity at γ = 0. Both residual variances also exhibit a discontinuity at
γ = 1 in MIE, because truth-telling can be sustained in equilibrium when coordination
is the only relevant task, given that private information has no value. In principle, these
discontinuities may be behaviorally relevant. For example, it could be that when γ is low
the players decide to play the game ignoring coordination, in which case full revelation is
an equilibrium. This, however, is not observed in our data.
A.2 Predictions about Normalized Coordination and Adaptation
Losses
Let CLk = E[(d
k
1 − dk2)2], k ∈ {C,D}, denote the normalized coordination loss. Similarly,
ALik = E[(d
k
i − θki )2], k ∈ {C,D}, denotes the normalized adaptation loss for an arbitrary
agent i, which is symmetric between agents. We have the following results.
Proposition 1. For any γ ∈ (0, 1), CLC < CLD. Also, dCLCdγ < 0 and dCLDdγ < 0.
Proof. From the proof of Proposition 2 in Alonso et al. (2008, pag. 174), it follows that
CLC = 2
(1− γ)2
(1 + 3γ)2
1 + γ
3 + 4γ
, (A.3)
CLD = 2(1− γ)2
[
1
3
− γ 2
(1 + γ)(4 + 3γ)
]
. (A.4)
Differentiating (A.3) and (A.4) with respect to γ gives
dCLC
dγ
= −2(1 + γ)(19 + 32γ + 5γ
2)
(1 + 3γ)3(3 + 4γ)2
< 0, (A.5)
dCLD
dγ
= −2
3
(1− γ)(56 + 64γ + 17γ2 + 3γ3)
(1 + γ)2(4 + 3γ)2
< 0. (A.6)
Finally, CLC < CLD, for any γ ∈ (0, 1), follows from Lemma 2 in Alonso et al. (2008). 
Proposition 2. For any γ ∈ (0, 1), ALiC > ALiD. Also, dAL
i
C
dγ
> 0 and
dALiD
dγ
> 0.
Proof. From the proof of Proposition 2 in Alonso et al. (2008, pag. 174), it follows again
that
ALiC =
1
3
− (1 + γ)(1 + 6γ + γ
2)
(1 + 3γ)2(3 + 4γ)
, (A.7)
ALiD =
7γ2 + γ3
3(1 + γ)(4 + 3γ)
. (A.8)
Differentiating (A.7) and (A.8) with respect to γ gives
dALiC
dγ
=
1 + 57γ + 131γ2 + 67γ3
(1 + 3γ)3(3 + 4γ)2
> 0, (A.9)
dALiD
dγ
=
γ
3
56 + 61γ + 14γ2 + 3γ3
(1 + γ)2(4 + 3γ)2
> 0. (A.10)
Finally, ALiC > AL
i
D, for any γ ∈ (0, 1), follows from Lemma 2 in Alonso et al. (2008). 
A.3 Additional Analysis of Communication Quality
Tables 6-11 provide several robustness checks of the results in Table 2. The analysis is
carried out for the first five periods of the experiment in Table 6 and the last five periods
of the experiment in Table 7. Table 8 repeats the analysis in Table 2 using messages instead
of guesses to form a measure of residual variance, providing a robustness check that does
not rely on our belief elicitation procedure. Table 9 repeats it excluding observations in
which (i) the state and message are of opposite signs or (ii) the guess and message are
of opposite signs, which might be interpreted as mistakes. Because entering a minus sign
requires effort, an arguably more plausible interpretation is that only observations where a
minus sign is forgotten represent mistakes. Following this interpretation, Table 10 repeats
the analysis excluding observations in which (i) the state is negative and the message
is positive and (ii) the message is negative and the guess is positive, i.e. where one of
the players “forgets” a minus sign. Table 11 runs the regression in Table 2 clustering
the standard errors at the level of the message receiver (the subject making the guess).
This controls for heterogeneity at the subject level without allowing for between-subject
correlations.
While we find no significant treatment effects in periods 1-5 of the experiment (Table
6), this observation should be taken with caution as the effects of time on communication
quality are not significant.62 Tables 7-11 suggest that the quality of communication was
significantly higher under centralization if and only if the importance of coordination was
low, as predicted by MIE and reported in the main text.
A.3.1 Analysis of Heterogeneity
To study whether the effects regarding communication quality were reflected in distribu-
tions at the level of individual subjects, we generate subject “types” as follows. For each
subject i, we take the observations where the subject was in the role of Player 1 and Player
2 and average out the distances |Sent Messageit− θit| between the subject’s messages and
states. We identify the resulting variable with the subject’s “lying type.”63 Notice that the
62Specifically, we can run a single regression using observations in periods 1-5 and 11-15 of the exper-
iment. If we introduce treatment dummies, a dummy for observations in later periods, and interactions
between the treatment dummies and the late observations dummy, we find that none of the interactions
are significant.
63As noted by a referee, these labels may be somewhat misleading. A subject might send a message as
a recommendation of what action to take, in which case the receivers’ guesses might not correspond to
Decentralized Centralized
γ = 0.25 0.4954 ≯ 0.2643
(0.1172) (0.0912)
 ∨  ∧
γ = 0.75 0.2815 ≮ 0.670
(0.0448) (0.2997)
Observations 1400
Session-clustered standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, **** p < 0.001
Table 6: Treatment effects on residual variance of communication (periods 1-5).
Decentralized Centralized
γ = 0.25 0.3701 >∗∗ 0.1158
(0.0722) (0.0499)
 ∨  ∧
γ = 0.75 0.1914 ≮ 0.2368
(0.1314) (0.1652)
Session-clustered standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, **** p < 0.001
Table 7: Treatment effects on residual variance of communication (periods 11-15).
Decentralized Centralized
γ = 0.25 0.2979 >∗∗ 0.1036
(0.0539) (0.054)
 ∨  ∧
γ = 0.75 0.1458 ≮ 0.2484
(0.070) (0.149)
Session-clustered standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, **** p < 0.001
Table 8: Treatment effects on residual variance of communication (messages as guesses).
lying type is equal to zero if the subject’s messages always corresponded to the states. Sim-
the messages. While our analysis below uses the “lying” and “mistrust” terminology, a careful reader will
keep this caveat in mind.
Decentralized Centralized
γ = 0.25 0.091 >∗∗ 0.0336
(0.022) (0.0077)
 ∨  ∧
γ = 0.75 0.104 ≮ 0.0956
(0.0415) (0.0461)
Session-clustered standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, **** p < 0.001
Table 9: Treatment effects on residual variance of communication (excluding observations
with sign switches).
Decentralized Centralized
γ = 0.25 0.2387 >∗∗∗∗ 0.0735
(0.0237) (0.0264)
∨∗∗  ∧
γ = 0.75 0.1163 ≮ 0.172
(0.0376) (0.0906)
Session-clustered standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, **** p < 0.001
Table 10: Treatment effects on residual variance of communication (excluding observations
with missing minus sign).
Decentralized Centralized
γ = 0.25 0.4272 >∗∗∗ 0.1796
(0.0686) (0.0327)
∨∗∗∗ ∧∗∗∗
γ = 0.75 0.2164 <∗∗ 0.3971
(0.0315) (0.066)
Session-clustered standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, **** p < 0.001
Table 11: Treatment effects on residual variance of communication (errors clustered by
receiver).
ilarly, averaging out the distances |Guessit − Received Messageit| between the subjects’
elicited posterior beliefs and received messages, we obtain the subject’s “mistrust type.” A
subject whose guesses always corresponded to the received messages had a mistrust type
of zero.
Mean Standard Deviation Median Observations
Decentralized-Low 0.108 0.203 0.022 48
Decentralized-High 0.078 0.127 0.03 56
Centralized-Low 0.038 0.085 0.003 66
Centralized-High 0.088 0.157 0.011 68
(a) Lying types.
Mean Standard Deviation Median Observations
Decentralized-Low 0.058 0.147 0.008 48
Decentralized-High 0.045 0.08 0.015 56
Centralized-Low 0.045 0.085 0.008 66
Centralized-High 0.08 0.115 0.043 68
(b) Mistrust types.
Table 12: Summary statistics of lying and mistrust types.
We find that 75 subjects had a lying type of zero, 64 subjects had a mistrust type
of zero, and 49 subjects had a lying type of zero and a mistrust type of zero.64 I.e.,
the vast majority of subjects had non-zero lying and mistrust types. A more detailed
description of the data is provided in Table 12, which suggests several observations that
can be related to our analysis of residual variance. First, we find that the mean and
median lying type was smaller in Centralized-Low than Decentralized-Low (P < 0.01 in a
Wilcoxon rank-sum test).65 Second, the difference between mistrust types in Centralized-
Low and Decentralized-Low was small and not significant (P = 0.889). I.e., the lying
type was smaller under centralization and the effect of centralization on the mistrust types
was not significant when the importance of coordination was low, which is consistent with
Prediction 1 and the results on residual variance. An increase in γ led to more lying
types (P < 0.05) and more mistrust types (P < 0.01) under centralization. This is
also consistent with the residual variance results, as they show no overall effect of γ in the
centralized treatments. Inconsistent with the results on residual variance, γ had little effect
64The correlation between the lying and mistrust types has a coefficient of ρ = 0.737.
65We use the Wilcoxon rank-sum test in all statistical comparisons in this paragraph.
on subjects’ types under decentralization (P = 0.735 for lying and P = 0.37 for mistrust
types). The discrepancy can be reconciled by the observation that when the quality of
communication is measured in terms of standard deviations |Other Stateit−Guessit|, the
significant difference between these two decentralized treatments disappears. This suggests
that the observed difference in residual variances of Decentralized-Low and Decentralized-
High was driven by relatively large errors in guesses.
Table 13, Table 14, Table 15, and Table 16 provide some robustness checks of the
results reported in Table 12. In Table 13, we exclude observations with particularly large
distances between states and messages and messages and guesses when computing players’
types. Specifically, when computing lying types, we exclude observations in which the
messages were of opposite sign of the associated states, and when computing mistrust
types, we exclude observations in which the guesses were of opposite sign of the messages.
In Table 14, we exclude observations in which the state was negative and the message
positive or the message was negative and the guess positive. In Table 15, we compute
lying and mistrust types using observations from the last five periods in the experiment,
which can be viewed as a robustness check for learning effects. In Table 16, we compute
the fractions of lying messages and mistrusting guesses in each of the treatments.66
Most of the statistical comparisons using the types in Tables 13-15 give qualitatively
similar results to those reported in Table 12. For instance, the lying types are significantly
smaller in Centralized-Low than Decentralized-Low (P < 0.01 leaving out observations
with sign switches or omitted minus signs). While the rank-sum test shows no signifi-
cant difference for later observations (P = 0.1645), the difference is significant according
to a t-test (P < 0.05). Similarly, in a regression with treatment dummy variables and
session-clustered errors, the coefficient on Centralized-Low is negative and strongly sig-
nificant for observations in the last five periods (P < 0.001). The fraction of lying mes-
sages is also smaller in Centralized-Low than Decentralized low, although the difference is
only marginally significant in this case (P < 0.1). As in Table 12, the mistrust types in
Centralized-Low and Decentralized-Low are not significantly different (P = 0.784 leaving
out sign switches, P = 0.7709 leaving out omitted minus signs, and P = 0.813 for later
observations). The fractions of mistrusting messages also do not significantly differ across
these two treatments (P = 0.9675).
66As before, a message is defined as lying if it is not equal to the state, while a guess is defined as
mistrusting if it is not equal to the message. For each subject, we first averaged each dummy variable to
compute the subject’s percentage of lying messages and mistrusting guesses. The table reports summary
statistics of these subject-level percentages by treatment.
Mean Standard Deviation Median Observations
Decentralized-Low 0.059 0.139 0.01 48
Decentralized-High 0.06 0.1 0.015 56
Centralized-Low 0.013 0.04 0.001 66
Centralized-High 0.043 0.073 0.011 68
(a) Lying types.
Mean Standard Deviation Median Observations
Decentralized-Low 0.034 0.11 0.007 48
Decentralized-High 0.032 0.053 0.013 56
Centralized-Low 0.026 0.044 0.007 66
Centralized-High 0.052 0.081 0.025 68
(b) Mistrust types.
Table 13: Summary statistics of lying and mistrust types (excluding observations with sign
switches).
Mean Standard Deviation Median Observations
Decentralized-Low 0.086 0.172 0.016 48
Decentralized-High 0.062 0.1 0.017 56
Centralized-Low 0.023 0.062 0.002 66
Centralized-High 0.053 0.089 0.011 68
(a) Lying types.
Mean Standard Deviation Median Observations
Decentralized-Low 0.04 0.12 0.007 48
Decentralized-High 0.033 0.057 0.013 56
Centralized-Low 0.029 0.049 0.007 66
Centralized-High 0.064 0.093 0.03 68
(b) Mistrust types.
Table 14: Summary statistics of lying and mistrust types (excluding observations with
omitted minus signs).
Mean Standard Deviation Median Observations
Decentralized-Low 0.105 0.267 0 48
Decentralized-High 0.076 0.174 0 56
Centralized-Low 0.022 0.08 0 66
Centralized-High 0.058 0.162 0 68
(a) Lying types.
Mean Standard Deviation Median Observations
Decentralized-Low 0.032 0.12 0 48
Decentralized-High 0.027 0.094 0 56
Centralized-Low 0.033 0.087 0 66
Centralized-High 0.045 0.115 0 68
(b) Mistrust types.
Table 15: Summary statistics of lying and mistrust types (types estimated from observa-
tions in the last five periods of the experiment).
Mean Standard Deviation Median Observations
Decentralized-Low 0.375 0.352 0.267 48
Decentralized-High 0.39 0.381 0.333 56
Centralized-Low 0.284 0.366 0.091 66
Centralized-High 0.415 0.397 0.273 68
(a) Lying messages.
Mean Standard Deviation Median Observations
Decentralized-Low 0.294 0.342 0.1 48
Decentralized-High 0.306 0.340 0.133 56
Centralized-Low 0.301 0.347 0.13 66
Centralized-High 0.396 0.361 0.317 68
(b) Mistrusting guesses.
Table 16: Percentages of lying messages and mistrusting guesses.
A.4 Robustness Checks for Section 3.2
For our econometric analysis of learning, we use the following model under centralization:
Decisionit =
(1 + β0 + β1Highit + β2t+ β3tHighit)
(1 + 3 ∗ (β0 + β1Highit + β2t+ β3tHighit) ×Guess of the Stateit+
+
2 ∗ (β0 + β1Highit + β2t+ β3tHighit)
(1 + 3 ∗ (β0 + β1Highit + β2t+ β3tHighit) ×Guess of the Other Stateit + it
and the following under decentralization:
Decisionit =(1− β0 − β1Highit − β2t− β3tHighit)× θit+
+
(β0 + β1Highit + β2t+ β3tHighit)
2
(1 + β0 + β1Highit + β2t+ β3tHighit)
×Guess of the Stateit+
+
(β0 + β1Highit + β3t+ β4tHighit)
(1 + β0 + β1Highit + β2t+ β3tHighit)
×Guess of the Other Stateit + it
In the baseline case (Table 5), the NLS models are identical with the exception that the
coefficients involving time (β2 and β3) are omitted. The coefficient estimates and standard
errors of the model with learning are reported in Table 17. The main text describes the
results.
The remaining tables in this section report the results of robustness checks described
in Section 3.2 of the main text. Table 18 is identical to Table 3, with the exception that
standard errors are clustered at the level of the decision maker (as opposed to session). The
models underlying Table 19, Table 20, and Table 21 are described in the last paragraph of
Section 3.2.
Decentralization Centralization
β0 0.684**** 0.0131*
(0.0883) (0.00632)
β1 0.189 0.252*
(0.139) (0.115)
β2 -0.0209**** 0.00193
(0.00179) (0.00162)
β3 0.0298* 0.00979
(0.0123) (0.00983)
Observations 1560 1320
Session-clustered standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, **** p < 0.001
Table 17: Effects of learning on distortions of decision rules (see Section A.4 for the coef-
ficient legend).
Decentralized Centralized
High (dummy=1 if γ = 34 ) -0.00735 0.0149
(0.0181) (0.0166)
State (θ) 0.493****
(0.0427)
Guess of the State 0.162**** 0.946****
(0.0396) (0.0130)
Guess of the Other State 0.345**** 0.0544****
(0.0297) (0.0130)
θ × High -0.270****
(0.0688)
Guess of the State × High 0.0576 -0.290****
(0.0710) (0.0339)
Guess of the Other State × High 0.213**** 0.290****
(0.0394) (0.0339)
Constant 0.0197 0.00615
(0.0138) (0.00956)
Observations 1560 1320
Session-clustered standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, **** p < 0.001
Table 18: Estimated decision weights (standard errors clustered by subject making the
decision).
Decentralized Centralized
γˆ when γ = 0.25 0.538 >∗∗∗ 0.25 0.055 <∗∗∗∗ 0.25
(0.128) (0.012)
γˆ when γ = 0.75 1.048 >∗∗∗∗ 0.75 0.414 <∗∗∗∗ 0.75
(0.057) (0.052)
Observations 1560 1320
Standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, **** p < 0.001
Table 19: Estimated distortions of γ (messages as proxies for beliefs).
Centralized
γˆ when γ = 0.25 0.052 <∗∗∗∗ 0.25
(0.012)
γˆ when γ = 0.75 0.443 <∗∗∗ 0.75
(0.072)
Observations 1320
Session-clustered standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, **** p < 0.001
Table 20: Estimated distortions of γ under centralization (estimated with beliefs of Player
1 and Player 2).
Decentralized Centralized
γˆ when γ = 0.25 0.517 >∗∗∗ 0.25 0.0296 <∗∗∗∗ 0.25
(0.081) (0.008)
γˆ when γ = 0.75 0.9396 >∗∗∗ 0.75 0.356 <∗∗∗∗ 0.75
(0.07) (0.067)
Observations 1560 1320
Subject-clustered standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, **** p < 0.001
Table 21: Estimated distortions of γ (subject-clustered errors).
A.4.1 Analysis of Heterogeneity
Table 22 compares the within-treatment means and medians of the estimated γ’s to their
predicted values. We find that the mean in Decentralized-Low is significantly greater than
predicted (P < 0.001 using a t-test), although the median is not (P = 0.685).67 While
the mean in Decentralized-High is not significantly greater than 0.75 (P = 0.291 using a
t-test), the median is (P < 0.001). Both of the means are significantly lower than predicted
in Centralized-Low and Centralized-High (P < 0.001 in both cases); while the median is
significantly lower than predicted in Centralized-Low (P < 0.001), but not in Centralized-
High (P = 0.523). The broad message of these findings is that Main Result 1 is reflected
not only in overall averages, but also in distributions at the level of individual subjects.
Mean Standard Deviation Median Observations
Decentralized-Low 0.446 0.377 0.278 48
Decentralized-High 0.792 0.296 0.983 56
Centralized-Low 0.07 0.15 0.004 66
Centralized-High 0.542 0.436 0.638 68
Table 22: Distributions of individual-level estimates of γ.
67When comparing the medians to the associated predicted values, we run a quantile regression for each
treatment. The dependent variable is the subject-level estimate of γ, and the single independent variable
is a constant. We then compare the estimated constant to its predicted value using an F-test.
A.5 Omitted Figures and Tables
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Figure 5: Points lost in the experiment by subject.
(1) (2)
(d1 − d2)2 (di − θi)2
Decentralized-High -0.0935 0.117**
(0.0532) (0.0428)
Centralized-Low 0.204** -0.145***
(0.0700) (0.0402)
Centralized-High -0.0596 0.0590
(0.0469) (0.0741)
Constant 0.319**** 0.220****
(0.0424) (0.0369)
Observations 1440 2880
Session-clustered standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, **** p < 0.001
Table 23: Degrees of adaptation and coordination in different experimental treatments.
The Decentralized-Low treatment serves as a baseline.
A.6 Additional Analysis of Payoffs
Recall that theory predicts expected payoffs under centralization to be higher for both
chosen values of γ. The first column of Table 24 presents the results of a regression in
which the total points lost by Player 1 and Player 2 from the decisions made in the game68
are regressed against the treatment indicator variables.69 The results show that losses are
marginally lower under centralization than decentralization when γ is low (P < 0.1). They
are also lower under decentralization when γ is high, although the difference in this case is
not statistically significant (P = 0.7738 in a test of equality of coefficients on Decentralized-
High and Centralized-High). These results are not consistent with the MIE predictions,
which is not surprising given the deviations from equilibrium behavior documented above.
The fact that γ is underweighted under centralization makes a principal’s comparative
advantage in coordination weaker. Similarly, that γ is overweighted under decentralization
weakens each agent’s comparative advantage in adaptation.
In the second column of Table 24, we regress the relative losses due to distortions against
the treatment dummies. The estimates show that these losses were positive and signifi-
cant in each of our treatments (P < 0.001 in every treatment). The negative coefficient
on Centralized-Low (P < 0.01) suggests that the relative losses due to distortions were
lower in this treatment than in the others. Recall that subjects in the centralized treat-
ments overweighted the importance of adaptation. The negative coefficient suggests that in
Centralized-Low, where coordination was not important, the overweighting of adaptation
was less costly than it was in Centralized-High. It was also less costly than the underweight-
ing of adaptation in the decentralized treatments. This is because in Decentralized-High–
where the underweighting of adaptation was less costly than in Decentralized-Low–the
subjects still found it difficult to coordinate their decisions. Table 25 shows that the rel-
ative loss due to miscoordination is higher in Decentralized-High than in Centralized-Low
(see also Appendix A.7).
The third column of Table 24 reports the results of a regression of subjects’ relative mis-
communication losses against the treatment indicator variables. These results show that
these losses were positive and significant in Decentralized-Low (P < 0.05 on the constant
term) and not in any other treatment (P > 0.1 on the test of the constant plus any of the
indicator variables being equal to zero). This is consistent with the results on communi-
cation quality reported in Section 3.1, where we find that the quality of communication is
68That is, excluding the points lost for guessing.
69Only subjects in the roles of Player 1 and Player 2 are used in this regression to avoid double-counting.
Total points lost Relative payoff loss Relative payoff loss
from the decisions from distortions from communication
Lobserved Lobserved − Lreported beliefs Lreported beliefs − LMIE
Decentralized-High 0.0667 0.346 -0.0116
(0.281) (0.283) (0.0260)
Centralized-Low -0.463* -0.600*** 0.140
(0.242) (0.163) (0.143)
Centralized-High 0.154 0.353 0.101
(0.260) (0.214) (0.0893)
Constant 1.959**** 1.268**** 0.0303**
(0.171) (0.157) (0.0120)
Observations 1440 1440 1440
Session-clustered standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, **** p < 0.001
Table 24: Payoff analysis. Lobserved = Lobserved1 + L
observed
2 denotes the total points lost by
Player 1 and Player 2 in the game due to the decisions, Lreported beliefs = Lreported beliefs1 +
Lreported beliefs2 denotes the points that the team would have lost if the decision makers
employed equilibrium decision rules with their reported (elicited) beliefs, and LMIE =
LMIE1 + L
MIE
2 denotes the total points that Player 1 and Player 2 would have lost if they
employed equilibrium decision rules and formed beliefs according to MIE.
significantly different from MIE in the Decentralized-Low treatment.
A.7 Additional Analysis of Adaptation and Coordination Losses
Table 25 breaks point losses of teams in different treatments of the experiment into misco-
munication and miscoordination components. Thus, for example, the miscommunication
component of the relative coordination loss in the treatments with γ = 3
4
is calculated as:70
2∑
i=1
{
3 ∗ ((dreported beliefsi − dreported beliefs−i )2 − (dMIEi − dMIE−i )2)
}
Note that this table can be used to recover the overall relative losses due to distortions or
communication reported in Table 24. For example, to compute the relative losses due to
distortions in Decentralized-Low (Table 24, constant term in the second column), add the
relative coordination losses due to distortions in Decentralized-Low (Table 25, first column,
second row) to the relative adaptation losses due to distortions in Decentralized-Low (Table
25, first column, fifth row).
Recall from the second column of Table 24 that the relative payoff losses due to dis-
tortions were smaller in Centralized-Low than in any of the other treatments. Table 25
provides evidence for our conjecture that this was driven by coordination losses being
smaller in Centralized-Low (where the overweighting of adaptation was less costly) than
in Centralized-High. Thus, while the coordination loss due to distortions was greater in
Centralized-High than in Centralized-Low, distortions in decision rules did not lead to
adaptation losses under centralization (all P > 0.1). The table also provides additional
evidence for Result 2: very little of the significant loss in payoffs is due to miscommu-
nication. As discussed above, the only treatment showing significant payoff loss due to
miscommunication is Decentralized-Low.
70The sum is necessary in the expression because the analysis of the decompositions is carried out in
terms of team rather than individual payoffs.
D-L D-H C-L C-H
Relative coordination loss 0.125 1.236**** 0.810**** 1.533****
(0.081) (0.191) (0.111) (0.120)
Relative coordination loss (Distortions) 0.111 1.233**** 0.826**** 1.533****
(0.070) (0.200) (0.097) (0.120)
Relative coordination loss (Miscommunication) 0.014 0.003 -0.017 0.0001
(0.014) (0.012) (0.016) (0.001)
Relative adaptation loss 1.173**** 0.397**** 0.028 0.219
(0.220) (0.038) (0.082) (0.134)
Relative adaptation loss (Distortions) 1.157**** 0.381**** -0.158 0.088*
(0.221) (0.042) (0.106) (0.050)
Relative adaptation loss (Miscommunication) 0.016**** 0.016 0.187 0.131
(0.002) (0.012) (0.134) (0.088)
Observations 360 420 330 330
Session-clustered standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, **** p < 0.001
Table 25: Decompositions of adaptation and coordination losses into a component due to
distortions of decision weights and a component due to miscommunication. The standard
errors are obtained by regressing each of the variables (e.g., relative coordination loss)
against the treatment dummies.
A.8 Simulations for Risk Preferences (Centralization)
To accommodate risk-seeking as well as risk-averse preferences, we assume that the decision
maker in the experiment has a utility function of the form U(x) = −(−x)α, with α > 1
leading to risk-averse and α ∈ (0, 1) to risk-seeking behavior. Suppose that authority is
centralized. Let νi be the principal’s posterior expectation about θi after having received
a message about θi. Suppose that ν˜i ∈ {νi − , νi + }, with  > 0, i = 1, 2. Let p =
Prob(ν˜i = νi + ). Then, E[ν˜i] = νi + (2p − 1) and V ar(ν˜i) = 4p(1 − p)2. When p is
close to 1
2
, the distribution of νi is a proxy for a uniform posterior distribution around the
posterior mean νi, as it would be in communication equilibria with risk-neutrality.
71 The
parameter  can be interpreted as a measure of uncertainty about the posterior expectation
νi. The problem of the principal can therefore be written as:
max
d1,d2∈R
−E [((1− γ)(d1 − ν˜1)2 + (1− γ)(d2 − ν˜2)2 + 2γ(d1 − d2)2)α] . (A.11)
If the principal were risk-neutral (α = 1), she would choose
di =
1 + γ
1 + 3γ
E[ν˜i] +
2γ
1 + 3γ
E[ν˜j], i = 1, 2, i 6= j. (A.12)
Note that the decision rules are exactly those used by the principal in our baseline model.
We perform simulations to calculate the average distance between the principal’s deci-
sions, |d1−d2|, for different values of ν1, ν2, α, and .72 In the simulations, we assume that
p = 1
2
73 and consider νi ∈ [−0.6, 0.6].74 Figure 6 shows the simulated average distances
D(, α) ≡ Mean(ν1,ν2)
{|dRS1 − dRS2 | − |dRN1 − dRN2 |} for different values of α and , with
α ∈ [0, 1].75 The figure shows that the simulated average distance is negative, which means
that the decisions are on average more coordinated under risk-seeking than risk-neutrality.
If we average over  ∈ [0, 0.4], and α ∈ [0, 1], we obtain that the average distance between
decisions under risk-seeking is -0.04 for γ = 1/4 and -0.01 for γ = 3/4.76 In the experiment,
71Although communication equilibria could have different features under risk aversion, we make this
distributional assumption for tractability.
72We set the grid sizes to 0.05 for νi, i = 1, 2, 0.02 for .
73Robustness checks suggest that the magnitude of distortions is little affected by relaxing it.
74The values of ν1 and ν2 are chosen in such a way that max {|νi − |, |νi + |} ≤ 1, i = 1, 2, given the
simulated values of  ∈ [0, 0.4]. Varying  over a smaller interval leads to smaller distortions.
75More precisely, we calculate the distance D for each vector (α, , ν1, ν2) and, holding α and  fixed,
average the distances obtained for different values of (ν1, ν2). The grid size for α is set at 0.05.
76We also performed simulations with a larger number of states, namely,
{
νi − , νi − 3 , νi + 3 , νi + 
}
,
i = 1, 2. We found similar qualitative and quantitative results.
the average absolute distance between the observed and risk-neutral equilibrium decisions,
|dObserved1 − dObserved2 | − |dEq1 − dEq2 |, is approximately 0.29 for Centralized-Low and 0.22 for
Centralized-High. Based on these simulation results, we conclude that risk-seeking cannot
explain the over-coordination observed in the centralized treatments in the data.
Simulation results for risk-averse preferences are shown in Figure 7. The figure gives
us a rough idea of how much risk aversion is necessary to generate distortions of the order
observed in the experiment. With α ∈ [1, 5],77 we obtain that the average difference in the
distances is 0.05 for γ = 1/4 and 0.01 for γ = 3/4. Although the simulated distortions go
in the same direction as what we observe in our data, the magnitudes are of a different
order even with highly unreasonable degrees of risk aversion. For example, averaging over
α ∈ [10, 20] only raises the average between distances to 0.098 for γ = 1/4 and 0.029
γ = 3/4. We performed simulations with alternative, standard, utility functions such as
the log and CRRA and obtained similar results. This shows that risk aversion can partly
explain the distortions observed in the centralized treatments with incomplete information
but cannot fully accommodate them.
77The grid size for α was increased to 0.1 due to the larger parameter interval.
(a) Comparison of average distances between optimal risk-seeking and risk-neutral decisions,
|dRS1 − dRS2 | − |dRN1 − dRN2 | for γ = 14 . Each point corresponds to the average over (ν1, ν2) ∈
[−0.6, 0.6]2 with a grid of size 0.05. The grid size for α is 0.05.
(b) Comparison of average distances between optimal risk-seeking and risk-neutral decisions,
|dRS1 − dRS2 | − |dRN1 − dRN2 | for γ = 34 . Each point corresponds to the average over (ν1, ν2) ∈
[−0.6, 0.6]2 with a grid of size 0.05. The grid size for α is 0.05.
Figure 6: The effect of risk-seeking on coordination behavior in centralized coordination
games.
(a) Comparison of average distances between optimal risk-averse and risk-neutral decisions, |dRA1 −
dRA2 | − |dRN1 − dRN2 | for γ = 14 . Each point corresponds to the average over (ν1, ν2) ∈ [−0.6, 0.6]2
with a grid of size 0.05.
(b) Comparison of average distances between optimal risk-averse and risk-neutral decisions, |dRA1 −
dRA2 | − |dRN1 − dRN2 | for γ = 34 . Each point corresponds to the average over (ν1, ν2) ∈ [−0.6, 0.6]2
with a grid of size 0.05.
Figure 7: The effect of risk aversion on coordination behavior in centralized coordination
games.
A.9 Simulations for Risk Preferences (Decentralization)
Under decentralization, we can without loss of generality consider the decision problem
of Player 1. Player 1 observes her own local conditions θ1 and needs to make a single
decision without knowing the decision made by Player 2. Let us reformulate the problem
assuming that the decision of Player 2, d˜2, is random from Player 1’s perspective and could
take on the value d2 +  with probability p, or d2 −  otherwise, where d2 ∈ (−1, 1) and
 ∈ (0, 1 − |d2|). We interpret d2 as the expected decision of Player 2 from Player 1’s
perspective.
Given a risk aversion coefficient α, Player 1’s decision problem can be written as
max
d1∈R
−E
[(
(1− γ)(d1 − θ1)2 + γ(d1 − d˜2)2
)α]
. (A.13)
If Player 1 were risk-neutral (α = 1), she would choose
d1 = (1− γ)θ1 + γE[d˜2]. (A.14)
Note that this decision rule is the same as the one used by Player 1 in the baseline model,
given our interpretation of d2.
We perform simulations to calculate the degree of adaptation, |d1 − θ1|, for different
values of θ1, d2, α, and . In the simulations, we assume that p =
1
2
and consider values
of θ1 ∈ [−1, 1], d2 ∈ [−0.6, 0.6], and  ∈ [0, 0.4].78 Figure 8 shows the simulated average
distances D(, α) ≡ Mean(θ1,d2)
{|dR1 − θ1| − |dRN1 − θ1|} for different values of α and .
The figure shows that the decisions are on average more adapted under risk-seeking than
risk neutrality, and more adapted under risk neutrality than under risk aversion. More
precisely, averaging over  ∈ [0, 0.4] and α ∈ {0.2, 0.4, 0.6, 0.8}, for a risk seeking decision
maker, we obtain that the average distances are approximately -0.02 for γ = 1/4, and
-0.05 for γ = 3/4. For degrees of risk aversion in the set {2, 3, 4, 5}, the same average
leads to 0.036 for γ = 1/4, and 0.05 for γ = 3/4. For comparison, the average distance
between decisions and states in the data is approximately 0.128 for γ = 1/4, and 0.10
for γ = 3/4. Thus, risk aversion explains the direction of the observed distortions under
decentralization. It is also provides quantitative benchmarks that are closer to the data
than their counterparts in the centralized case.
78The grids for θ1, d2, and  are 0.01, 0.01, and 0.02, respectively.
(a) Comparison of average distances between optimal risky and risk neutral level of adaptation,
|dR1 − θ1| − |dRN1 − θ1| for γ = 14 , different attitudes toward risk, α ∈ {0.2, 0.4, 0.6, 0.8, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5},
and different values of  ∈ [0, 0.4] with grid of size 0.02. Each point corresponds to the average
over (θ1, d2) ∈ [−1, 1]× [−0.6, 0.6] with a grid of size 0.01.
(b) Comparison of average distances between optimal risky and risk neutral level of adaptation,
|dR1 − θ1| − |dRN1 − θ1| for γ = 34 , different attitudes toward risk, α ∈ {0.2, 0.4, 0.6, 0.8, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5},
and different values of  ∈ [0, 0.4] with grid of size 0.02. Each point corresponds to the average
over (θ1, d2) ∈ [−1, 1]× [−0.6, 0.6] with a grid of size 0.01.
Figure 8: The effect of attitudes toward risk on the degree of adaptation in decentralized
coordination games.
A.10 Simulations for Ambiguity Preferences (Centralization)
We now use simulations similar to those described in Sections A.8 and A.9 to argue that
strategic uncertainty about communication rules combined with ambiguity-aversion can
generate distortions of larger magnitudes than those generated by risk-aversion alone.
Moreover, ambiguity-aversion can generate distortions in the right direction even with
risk-seeking preferences. To see this, assume that the principal solves the following opti-
mization problem:
max
d1,d2∈R
min
µ∈{(p,1−p),(1−p,p)}
−Eµ
[(
(1− γ)(d1 − ν˜1)2 + (1− γ)(d2 − ν˜2)2 + 2γ(d1 − d2)2
)α]
.
Here, µ indexes the principal’s belief system, which specifies beliefs both about ν1 and
about ν2.
79
The belief system can be either (p, 1 − p) or (1 − p, p). If µ = (p, 1 − p), p is the
probability that ν1 is high as well as the probability that ν2 is low.
80 If µ = (1− p, p), then
p is the probability that ν1 is low as well as the probability that ν2 is high. Thus, for any
p 6= 1/2, the principal considers two belief systems: one in which the probability that ν1 is
high is greater than the probability that ν2 is high, and another in which the probability
that ν2 is high is greater than the probability that ν1 is high. Intuitively, for any (ν1, ν2),
the principal posterior beliefs can take on one of four values: (ν1− , ν2− ), (ν1− , ν2 + ),
(ν1 + , ν2− ), or (ν1 + , ν2 + ). The principal will use one of two belief systems (p, 1− p)
and (1− p, p) to compute her expected utility. Ambiguity-aversion will make the principal
select the belief system under which “bad” posteriors–posteriors where beliefs about ν1 and
ν2 are further apart–are more likely. In the simulation, we consider three possible values
for p ∈ {0.1, 0.3, 0.6}. To complete the description of the simulation, we assume that both
belief systems are equally likely, so that an ambiguity neutral decision maker will have a
posterior belief equal to 1/2 for any of our possible values of p.
Our simulation results with different values of p and α are reported in Figure 9 in the
appendix. These results show that introducing ambiguity-aversion amplifies the distortions
caused by risk aversion considerably. Thus, even with risk neutrality, that is, α = 1, we
obtain that the average difference in the distances, over our simulated values of p, is 0.121
for γ = 1/4 and 0.028 for γ = 3/4. Increasing the risk aversion coefficient to α = 2
increases the average difference in distance to 0.1388 for γ = 1/4 and 0.036 for γ = 3/4,
thus tripling the average distances compared to an ambiguity neutral but risk averse agent
79Recall that we assume ν1 and ν2 are independent.
80Formally, p = Prob(ν˜1 = ν1 + ) and p = Prob(ν˜1 = ν1 − ).
with the same attitudes toward risk. We conclude that reasonable degrees of risk aversion
(i.e., α = 2), coupled with extreme aversion to ambiguity, can account for 16% to 50%
of the distortions observed in the data. Moreover, note that when p is either sufficiently
low or sufficiently high, the simulated distortions are quantitatively close to those for an
ambiguity neutral decision maker for values of α in the upper part of the interval [0, 1].
This suggests that ambiguity-aversion can generate a reasonable fit to the data even with
moderate risk-seeking preferences.
(a) Comparison of average distances between optimal maxmin and risk/ambiguity-neutral deci-
sions, |dAA1 − dAA2 | − |dRN1 − dRN2 | for γ = 14 , different degrees of risk aversion α, and different
distribution parameters p. Each point corresponds to the average over (ν1, ν2) ∈ [−0.6, 0.6]2 with
a grid of size 0.05. The grid size for the decisions is 0.05, and the value of  = 0.4.
(b) Comparison of average distances between optimal maxmin and risk/ambiguity-neutral deci-
sions, |dAA1 − dAA2 | − |dRN1 − dRN2 | for γ = 34 , different degrees of risk aversion α, and different
distribution parameters p. Each point corresponds to the average over (ν1, ν2) ∈ [−0.6, 0.6]2 with
a grid of size 0.05. The grid size for the decisions is 0.05, and the value of  = 0.4.
Figure 9: The effect of ambiguity-aversion on coordination behavior in centralized coordi-
nation games.
